Naval War College Review
Volume 64
Number 1 Winter

Article 12

2011

Organizing OPNAV (1970–2009)
Thomas Culora

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Culora, Thomas (2011) "Organizing OPNAV (1970–2009)," Naval War College Review: Vol. 64 : No. 1 , Article 12.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/12

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Culora: Organizing OPNAV (1970–2009)

BOOK REVIEWS

REARRANGING DECK CHAIRS: THE NEAR-NORMAL STATE FOR THE
NAVY STAFF
Swartz, Peter M., with Michael C. Markowitz. Organizing OPNAV (1970–2009). Alexandria, Va.: Center
for Naval Analyses, January 2010. 118pp. Available at www.dtic.mil.

For any institution adapting to change,
the dreaded “R-word” (reorganization)
has come to represent an often disruptive, albeit necessary, transition. But as
the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
authors Peter Swartz and Michael
Markowitz clearly highlight, reorganization has been the near-normal state
for the Navy Staff (OPNAV) over the
past several decades. Conducted under
the sponsorship of the Naval History
and Heritage Command, this CNA report effectively tracks the numerous
changes in the organization of OPNAV
in response to changes both in Chiefs of
Naval Operations (CNOs) and in the
strategic and budgetary environments
since 1970.
As experienced CNA researchers,
Swartz and Markowitz have applied
their knowledge and experience in analysis, policy, and history to assemble a
highly accurate and credible compendium of the mechanics of change in
OPNAV over a forty-year span. Swartz
has special insight here. As a former
Navy captain, he served on the OPNAV
staff during part of the period covered

by this report and is currently CNA’s
adviser to the Strategy and Policy Division (N51), giving him both an outsider’s and insider’s view of the process
and personalities.
The study focuses on answering three
principal questions: What have been the
significant changes to the OPNAV staff,
why were these changes made, and what
observations and conclusions can be
drawn from these changes? Swartz and
Markowitz admit that the emphasis of
the study was in the “data-gathering
task” embodied in the first question.
Also, some readers may find the
“PowerPoint with heavy notation” format of the study off-putting. However,
this format lends itself to understanding
the complex structures, timelines, and
machinations of the reorganization efforts of each successive CNO from the
1970s onward.
The taxonomy used by Swartz and
Markowitz in presenting and categorizing the myriad changes in the OPNAV
staff structure provides a highly understandable and ordered review of the
complicated and sometimes confusing
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organizational adaptations. Especially
useful are the four “context” tables, one
for each decade starting with the 1970s,
that list by year who was presiding as
CNO, along with the relevant Navy capstone documents, the Navy’s “total
[that is, financial] obligation authority,” total number of ships in the fleet,
new ships arriving in the fleet, active
personnel, and new capabilities introduced. Juxtaposed against the numerous organizational charts in the report,
these context tables help in understanding how each CNO has reorganized, not
only responding to the variety of exogenous forces but also to implement his
own vision for the future of the Navy.
By recounting in detail the reorganization that the current CNO, Admiral
Gary Roughead, has made to the staff,
readers can see for themselves the most
consequential changes enacted and, by
extension, the most consequential issues facing the Navy today, in
Roughead’s view.
Swartz and Markowitz identify two
major changes made by Admiral
Roughead. First is the consolidation of
the Intelligence (N2) and the Communications Networks (N6) directorates
into a newly created Directorate for Information Dominance (N2/6), a move
that underscores the critical importance
of a holistic approach to communications and intelligence, including the
emerging preeminence of cyber and
electronic warfare. The future impact of
this consolidation could be quite large,
given the issues at stake.
Second, equally as revealing has been
the morphing of the staff’s internal
think tank, “Deep Blue,” into the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) cell to
meet the challenges of the recent QDR,
and finally into the Naval Warfare
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Integration Group (00X), in late 2009.
One function of 00X will be, acting as a
“special assistants” group, to provide
the CNO with direct assessments of
Navy programs and systems. Plainly,
this CNO sees a critical need to be
armed with as much information and
analysis as possible to address the tremendous budgetary pressures affecting
the Navy, which pose a special challenge to the future health of the naval
force, a challenge requiring particular
attention and focus.
Where the study itself is admittedly thin
is in its narratives—which might have
been richer—of the colorful personalities, nuanced forces, and institutional
rivalries that sculpted the shape of the
OPNAV staff during a very dynamic period. Those wanting an Allisonian-like
examination of the organizational, political, and personal dynamics shaping
this change will have to wait for what
Swartz and Markowitz recommend as
next steps: an expansion of the study to
personalities, relationships, and indepth answers to the “why” question.
Until then, scholars of U.S. Navy history and organizational studies can be
content with this well researched, accurate, and informative report.
THOMAS CULORA, Chairman, Warfare Analysis
and Research Department
Naval War College
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Students of American national security
policy, particularly those without the
benefit of firsthand policy-making
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